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Underpricing has been one of the few areas in Finance where researchers have reached 
consensus. The majority of studies cover few decades of IPOs in the more recent period of 
stability. We explore Greek IPOs during the long interval 1905-2010, a period over which 
many political, financial and regulatory changes took place. IPOs on the Athens Stock 
Exchange continued throughout the period with exceptions in times of crisis and war. 
Underpricing appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon which intensified with financial 
liberalization. Firm-specific factors, market conditions and institutional arrangements appear 
to have significant impact on the level of underpricing. It is likely that market development 
with massive participation of retail investors creates a complex environment with incentives 
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In 1880 the law forming the Athens Stock Exchange was published in the Greek 
government gazette. The Exchange, whose formation had been announced in 1876, 
commenced actual operations in May 1980. The first shares that were listed for trading were 
those of the National Bank of Greece. Government bonds were also listed. Since then there 
have been more than 500 Initial Public Offerings for shares (IPOs), a considerable number 
for a peripheral exchange.  
 Such a very long span of IPO history has not been studied in the relevant 
international literature, with few and less extended exceptions. Greek IPO data can be used 
to make a variety of contributions to the study of the development of equity finance as a 
major contributor to firm and economic growth.  In this paper we undertake three 
interrelated goals. The first is to obtain a general description of the frequencies of IPO and 
its relationship to the state of the Greek economy at various historical phases. The second is 
to reflect on whether institutional and regulatory changes have had an effect on the 
occurrence and the features of IPOs. The third is to study the phenomenon of “IPO 
underpricing” over the long span.  
IPO underpricing is one of the „stylized facts‟ of modern finance on which there is 
wide consensus among scholars. It implies a market inefficiency in setting listing prices and 
results in cash losses for issuers who receive lesser amounts than the market value of the 
shares they offer. This in turn implies an increase in the cost of equity capital. The 
benefactors of IPO underpricing are those investors who acquire shares at the listing price 
and who can subsequently benefit from positive returns on the first day of trading or even 
later.  
 There is a long international literature on underpricing, based on the observation of 
stock returns during the first trading day for newly listed shares. Logue (1973), Ibbotson 
(1975), Ritter (1984), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Gajewski and Gresse (2006) are well 
known examples of studies referring to both the U.S. and Europe and offering persuasive 
empirical evidence that underpricing is the rule in IPOs. This evidence has been replicated 
in many countries around the world. The data used in most studies cover at most three 
decades and refer to evidence from the post-world war II era. Some historical work has also 
been undertaken however. Champers and Dimson have undertaken a study of British IPOs 
since the First World War. Burhop (2008) has studied IPOs in the Berlin Stock Exchange in 
the last three decades of the 19
th
 century. Schlag and Wodrich (2000)  investigate the pricing 
of German IPOs in the pre-war period 1882-1914. Historical studies focus on changes in 
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institutional detail over time and support the view that IPO underpricing appears to be a 
„modern‟ phenomenon of the last four decades, exhibiting increasingly larger size in recent 
periods.  
This paper presents the historical series of IPO data in the Athens Stock Exchange 
which enable us to observe broad relationships between IPO occurrence, economic growth 
or crisis and major institutional changes in the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate very 
clearly, in line with international evidence, that IPO underpricing is a „modern‟ phenomenon 
in the Greek stock market. We undertake econometric estimation of first-day returns and 
find that several of the empirical variables used in modern analyses of underpricing have a 
significant impact on historical returns. Institutional and market conditions also play a large 
role. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a broad overview of historical 
developments in the Greek economy, emphasizing the distinction between periods of boom 
and periods of crisis. We examine in a descriptive way whether the frequency of IPOs 
relates to the state of the economy. In section 3 we present major institutional changes in the 
stock exchange and determine a relevant periodization for our data set. In section 4 we 
discuss data and methodology and in section 5 we present estimation and results. Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Historical Background1 
Greek economic history over the last 105 years has had many turns, including periods of  
warrant geographic expansion, crisis and boom. In general, periods of crisis were either 
those that related to geopolitical events such as war, civil war and mass immigration; or 
periods related to international economic crisis, such as occurred in the 1930s, the late 
1970s-early1980s, and the present crisis of  2009. On the other hand, periods of boom were 
periods of relative stability in political and economic conditions, international growth and/or 
a boom in domestic entrepreneurship and economic activity.  
 We are of course aware that any broad characterization of periods may invite 
criticism for oversimplification, as it is true that within periods of crisis or periods of boom 
there are fluctuations, exceptions and turnarounds. Nevertheless, using a variety of 
bibliographical sources we offer the following broad characterization of historical phases. 
                                               
1 i) Valaoritis I.A., „The history of the National Bank of Greece, (1842 1902)‟ Athens 1903, ii) Vaxenoglou 
Aliki, 
„The Greek Capitalists, 1900 – 1940, Themelio, 1994 iii) Vournas Tasos, „The history of recent and modern 
Greece‟, Athens 1999, iv) Kokkinakis Ioannis, „Currency and politics in Greece, 1830-1910‟ Alexandria, 
1999, v) Riginou M, „The movement of foreign exchange and currencies‟ 
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Periods of war can be generally characterized as periods of anomaly in the 
functioning of the economy and great uncertainty in the medium and long-term outlook for 
the economy. Greece has had a larger share of such periods than most other European 
countries. The Balkan wars of 1912-13, Greece‟s engagement in the First World War during 
1916-18, the Greco-Turkish war in Asia Minor of 1920-22, the second world war of 1940-
44, and the civil war of 1946-49 were such periods of anomaly and uncertainty. Over the 
whole span of 105 years in our study, 17 were years in which the country was engaged in 
direct military conflict.  
Periods of international crisis also affected the economic outlook of Greece, whose 
economy was never inward looking but depended in significant ways on developments in 
the international economy. Major international crises occurred in 1931-34 (the Great 
Depression), in 1978-84 (the second energy crisis) and in 2007 to date (the great financial 
crisis). Altogether these periods of major international crisis represent 15 years of upheaval 
and uncertainty.  
 If we now turn to periods of exceptional performance in terms of growth and 
structural transformation in the economy, we could single out four distinct episodes in 
Greek economic history. The first covers the period 1905-1911 when the Greek economy 
made a spectacular comeback from an earlier crisis that had arisen from its sovereign default 
in the 1890s. During this time many institutional changes took place in the areas of taxation 
and economic policy.   
 A second period of exceptional performance covers the years 1923-1928, during 
which Greek growth was pushed in the direction of industrialization. The latter was 
supported by the increase of the population after the Asia Minor defeat and by the large 
expenditures undertaken to shelter, feed, and embody the immigrants (who brought 
considerable skills with them) into the economy. This period of growth and transformation 
was interrupted with the international crisis that broke out in 1930. 
A third period of exceptional performance was 1957-1973. This was the era of the 
post-war “Greek economic miracle” when average economic growth was the highest in 
Europe, with booming exports whose composition shifted to manufacturing over the period, 
major increases in financial saving, and low inflation. This long period of growth was 
interrupted by the first energy crisis and the synchronous political (and geopolitical) crisis 
that led to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the collapse of the Greek Junta in 1974.  
 A final period of exceptional performance occurred as Greece came to the 
antechamber of admission to the EMU and during the first years of its participation in that 
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Union. This is the period 1998-2006 in which significant growth rates and low inflation 
predominated. The Olympic Games in 2004 became an engine of public and private 
investment which upheld good economic performance and positive expectations.  
Table 1 includes our data on a yearly basis. All values have been converted and are 
expressed in Euro
2
. The Table includes only years in which IPOs actually occurred, and the 
years referred to are years when trading was initiated.  
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
The fourth column in Table 1 shows the estimated first day return of new listed shares over 
the listing price. It is immediately evident that, with only very slight exceptions, 
underpricing was not present in pre-war IPOs. It appears to be a phenomenon of the post – 
war era. This observation accords with the findings of Champers and Dimson (2009) who 
examined a comparably long period of British IPOs. (See also below, section 4.1). 
 Table 2 presents the data in more concise form. In its Panel A we group IPOs on the 
basis of our historical analysis of periods of crisis, exceptional growth and intermediate 
conditions. In Panel B we show averages by decades. In Panel C, we group the data in a 
meaningful chronological periodization, from an institutional perspective (see also below 
section 3).  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
If we examine the findings in Panel A we note that they encompass 34 years of crisis and 
war, 39 years of exceptional performance and 33 years of intermediate conditions which 
include either modest growth or modest recession. It is clear from the estimates of Panel A 
that IPOs are more preponderant during periods of exceptional growth, as compared to 
periods of crisis and war. However, there appears to be only a small difference in terms of 
average IPO activity between periods of exceptional growth and intermediate periods. This 
is an interesting finding since it indicates that IPOs take place at most times, but it may be 
their values that vary depending on the character of the historical phase. Value comparisons 
however are not really informative since our data are still expressed in nominal prices. 
 The estimations of Panel B confirm the general impression that we obtained by 
perusing Table 1. IPO underpricing is a post-war phenomenon. Within the post-war period 
                                               
2 All amounts are here reported in nominal prices 
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moreover, underpricing appears to rise consistently through the decades, with only a small 
decline of average underpricing in the latest decade of 2000-9. This is clearly a phenomenon 
that has to be analyzed in greater detail, and is taken up in later sections of the paper.  
 Finally Panel B shows a reasonable periodization of our data set into three distinct 
periods. One is the pre-war and war eras during which no underpricing is discernible. The 
second is the period from 1950 to 1988 when underpricing is discernible but in which the 
Greek financial system was heavily regulated. The third is the period 1990-2010 which can 
be broadly characterized as a period of major financial reform. In this period also 
underpricing of IPOs is quite evident and much larger than the earlier post-war period. It 
would appear on the face of this evidence that financial liberalization is associated broadly 
with much higher levels of underpricing. Our subsequent analysis of underpricing will 
therefore focus on only the two subperiods of the post – war era.  
 
3 Historical Issues and Regulatory Changes 
 
Over the span of the last century the Athens IPO market experienced profound structural 
change via Great Depression effect, Hyper-Inflation phenomenon, Price Cap regulatory 
changes, and conversion of earnings forecast regime. In this section, we discuss this 
development in turn       
 
A. ASE during the Great Depression  
 
Paradoxically, the structure of the Greek economy at the time protected it from the dramatic 
effects of the international economic crises of 1929-1932. For the same reason the Greek 
stock market was not immediately affected by the international stock market crash of 
October 1929. Besides, prices on the local market were not at their higher levels, as they had 
been on the markets of America and Europe. In addition, the capital markets, as a whole did 
not play as an important role in the local economy as their foreign counterparts played in 
their respective economies. So, the downturn in economic activity and in stock prices never 
reached the magnitude it did in other more developed economies and stock markets.  
 Nevertheless, by mid November, pressure began to be exerted on prices. These 
pressures were intensified by the fall in agricultural and manufactured products. By 
December, the situation on the stock market had deteriorated alarmingly. This collapse in 
prices is of course primarily owed to the stock market panic that had wrapped its arms 
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around the whole world. However, causes for this collapse must also be considered the 
plethora of high yield government bonds that were issued, which pushed aside the public‟s 
interest for companies shares, the short supply of money and the heavy taxation of 
corporations.  
 Throughout the period 1929-1932 the stock market remained bearish. This 
occurrence was fuelled by the bear-ravaged markets of abroad and by the shrinking of 
domestic company and companies going public to raise fund. It is worth noting that in 1932 
company profits were restricted to only 40% of those in 1929. At that time a decision was 
made to suspend operations on the stock market, which caused numerous difficulties in the 
settlement of transactions. The problem was solved by regulatory statute, which brought 
changes on the IPOs transparency issues, in mid December 1932. 
 
B. Hyper Inflation Periods 
 
Bernholz and Gersbach (1992) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003) pointed out that the crucial 
condition for generating hyperinflation is that real money balances should not decrease more 
than inflation increases with high rates of inflation. In Greece with the circulation of the 
50,000 drachmae and 100,000 drachmae bank note, in 1944 - during the World War II, the 
public‟, trust in the currency fell. Profiteering by the occupiers was evident. By receiving 
large sums from the Bank of Greece on repayment of loans, they immediately bought 
sovereigns, something that resulted to the skyrocketing of their price. With Act 2021 
companies and banks were obliged to raise their equity by 20% and 10% respectively. 
Furthermore, the new shares, which arose from this increase in equity, were to be turned 
over at no cost to the Government that in turn liquidated them, the proceeds going to the 
public.     
 In time the situation worsened and the economy fell into a state of paralysis. Bank 
notes with a face value of 100 million drachmae were circulated and were later followed by 
those with face value of 1 billion and 10 billion Drachmae. Indicative of the situation a little 
after the liberation of the country, the monthly salary of an unskilled employee at the Stock 
Exchange was Dr 40 Trillion.   
 The financial situation of the Stock Exchange was also in a poor state. This was so 
because the fees paid by the listed companies had been fixed relative to July‟s average share 
prices and the contributions paid by the members had been fixed relative to the pre-war 
value of the Drachma. The Stock Exchange was no longer in a position to pay its 
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employees, who during that time were facing severe financial difficulties, as were the people 




Apart from the Hyper-inflation period of 1944 Greece under its currency (drachmae) 
experienced various levels of inflation due to continuously rise in the general levels of 
prices of goods and services. High level of currency instability created problems as the 
purchasing power of drachmae was difference in various periods in the time. On the one 
hand the main characteristic of the monetary situation of the time was the great instability of 
the currency which arose from the rapid appreciation of domestic prices
3
 and the continual 
devaluation of the drachma against foreign currencies and gold.  
The rampant inflation which historically has been created was mainly due to the 
fiscal imbalances that resulted from the successive wars, civil war, increase in industrial 
production, the displacement of the population and the political instabilities of the previous 
years
4
.    
  To avoid comparability problems we present in our study both adjusted (Table 3) 
and unadjusted (Appendix) for inflation figures. Gross Domestic Product was introduced as 
a measure for inflations mainly because the accessibility on this index on the very early 
years of our study
5
. In order to make use of only one currency and simplify the calculations 
all the GDP amounts were converted in Historical U.S. dollars either during the drachmae 
period and „new drachmae‟ periods (before 2001) either when Euro was introduced (after 
January 2001).    
     
D. The 1990s and major financial reforms 
 
The Greek financial system was heavily regulated during the early post-war era. Capital 
movement into and out of the country was controlled. Interest rates were administratively 
set and credit allocations by banks were also subject to administrative constraints. The 
                                               
3 Such cases was between 1922 and 1927 with average annual rise in prices of 20%, at the end of 1973 with an 
inflation rate of 30% (33.4 in Dec 1973) and a deteriorating balance of payment. Further the inflation rate 
between 1975 and 1978 was at 12.4%, the 1979-1985 it was fluctuating between 18% and 23%, in 1990 at 
22.88%). During 1995-1996 after 22 years the inflation rate stabilized below 10% a fact that essentially led the 
economy out of years of stagflation. The inflation rate at the end of 2000 was 3.2% 
4 The governments covered its increasing outflows, by resorting to borrowing, mainly from within and 
especially from the banking system.  
5 Alternative measures includes the consumer price index, producer price index, commodity price index, 
regional inflation, historical inflation and asset price inflation.   
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Athens Stock Exchange was probably the only part of the financial sector that allowed a free 
formation of prices in a secondary market, but suffered from low liquidity. It remained a 
small market in the context of overall financial controls Niarchos (1995).  
Financial reform in Greece began with major changes in 1988 that enabled both the 
liberalisation of banking and the concurrent institutional reorganisation of the Athens Stock 
Exchange. Law 1806/88 promulgated important reforms such as the formation of brokerage 
companies with sufficient own capital, the creation of a parallel market for exchange listing 
of small, medium and young companies and the introduction of market-making in exchange 
transactions.  
 The ensuing decade was one cascading reforms that encompassed an administrative, 
organisational and technological revolution in the capital market. On one hand, the systems 
of transactions were completely modernised enabling the access of retail investors to the 
market. On the other hand, regulatory change was instituted through the establishment of an 
authority of public regulation for the capital market. (Niarchos (1995), Thomadakis (2010). 
 We can list major reforms which are directly relevant to IPO activity. First, as we 
mentioned, was the creation of a parallel market for small young companies which began its 
operation in 1990. The IPO activity in this market was considerable in the decade that 
followed. Secondly, there was the introduction of electronic trading and of a securities 
depository that enabled both a large increase in the transactional capacity of the Athens 
Stock Exchange and a decisive amelioration in the credibility of transactions and the safety 
of ownership of shares. In fact, at the end of the decade, stock ownership was fully 
„dematerialized‟ and transactions were conducted and settled exclusively by electronic 
means. All these conditions enabled a large change in investor access to stock exchange 
transactions and the population of active investors multiplied and expanded to 
unprecedented levels.  
 On the regulatory front, an independent regulatory authority was launched. The 
Hellenic Capital Market Commission was founded by law in 1991, upgraded in 1995 and 
became fully operational directly thereafter. Its powers paralleled those of homologous 
European regulators. The Capital Market Commission enacted comprehensive provisions 
for investor protections, based on extant European legislation but also autonomous domestic 
regulation. Examples of the former were the launch of enforcement (for the first time in 
Greece) of prohibitions of market abuse (market manipulation and insider trading) and a 
strong upgrade of transparency requirements for IPO prospectuses. An example of 
autonomous domestic provisions was the institution of daily price limits for market trading 
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in 1994, the regulation of the practice of public offers including the introduction of  book-
building, and the creation of a code of conduct for underwriters. 
 This cascade of institutional and organizational reforms contributed to an increase in 
confidence in stock market investments and to large growth both in the demand and the 
supply of shares by retail and institutional investors as well as issuing companies. No doubt 
however, confidence grew because of macroscopic factors, as well. Macroeconomic 
stabilization and the installation of a new phase of economic growth in the middle 1990s, 
the prospect of Greek entry in the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe and the general 
optimism that accompanied fast world economic growth played a role. Indeed, these very 
macroscopic factors were interconnected with the pace and content of reforms that led to the 
institutional and organizational cascade of financial reform in the 1990s.  
When reforms take place at a fast pace and are all – encompassing it is not always 
possible to disentangle the effects of specific elements of these reforms upon the operation 
of the market. In the case of IPOs we can nevertheless locate specific elements of the 
reforms to which we can attribute direct relevance:  
 
a. the launch of the parallel market allowed less mature companies into stock exchange 
trading; a natural consequence was that uncertainty about the quality of entrants 
would be increased as this category of new entrants made its inroads into IPO 
activity. 
b. higher transparency requirements including (during some interval) the obligation for 
newly entering firms to publish earnings‟ forecasts were clearly directed at the 
reduction of informational asymmetry between issuers/underwriters and investors. 
c. Caps on daily variation of stock prices including (during some interval) strict limits 
on early trading of newly listed shares so as to mitigate extreme speculative activity. 
d. The introduction of „book-building‟ for new listings whereby the underwriter could 
engage in price discovery through declarations of intent by institutional investors 
before setting the listing price.  
 
These specific institutional arrangements, within the broader reforms, may have had an 
impact both on the frequency of IPOs and on the degree of underpricing. One study for 
example (Thomadakis et al. (2011) ) has shown that the application of  price caps during 
early trading of IPOs reduced underpricing, ceteris paribus, in the period 1994-96, during 
which they were enforced.  
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 On the whole we must point out however that the relationship between reform and 
IPO occurrence is neither linear not can it be disentangled into direct functional links. This 
is evident from the fact that within the period 1990-2010, where the intensity and depth of 
reform was historically unprecedented, there was a great deal of variation in IPO activity. 
 
E. Price Cap Phenomenon – Investors Protection 
 
Greece has been one of the few countries around the world where a regulatory restriction 
has covered IPO short term performance, Thomadakis et al. (2010). This is the imposition of 
limits on price variation after listing.  
Specifically, initially, price fluctuations in the Athens Stock Exchange were 
unconstrained for all shares. In order to protect investors and the market from „speculative 
attacks‟ that might be encouraged by the vulnerable macroeconomic condition and exchange 
rate fluctuations of that period the Greek Regulator (The Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission at the recommendation of the Stock Exchange) imposed a limit on daily 
variation. This regulation was applied to all stocks, including newly issued ones from their 
first day of trading. In particular, within any day a stock price could fluctuate within a range 
of ±8%. When a price reached the limit, it would freeze at that limit and no more trading 
could take place on the same day, except at (or of course within) the limit range. The stock 
would start trading again on the next day, its starting price being the locked price of the 
previous day. If the demand and supply continued to be high/low during the trading, then 
the stock locked again and trading of its shares was again transferred to the following day.   
High demand on IPOs over the years which followed, forced the HCMC to 
reconsider the trading regulation and finally provide more elasticity on the fluctuation 
during the initial days. Specifically, newly listed shares were now allowed to fluctuate 
within a limit of ±99% for the first three days of trading (from the fourth day on, the limit of 
±8% continued to apply). This regulation changed again with adjustment of the daily 
fluctuation price limits of shares that are traded for the first time following the end of their 
suspension period. In the case of shares, which are traded for the first time after their trading 
was suspended for a period greater than three months, the daily fluctuation price limits 
(upper and lower) was not in effect for the first three days of trading. Therefore, the market 
could evaluate quickly the price of a newly listed stock without the interference of a ceiling 




F. Conversion of Earnings Forecast Regime  
 
Companies making initial public offerings in Greece were obliged to include next year‟s 
profit in the new issue prospectuses until the regulations changed to voluntary status. Greece 
based on the international literature (Firth, et al. (1995), Jaggi (1997), Chen and Firth 
(1999), Clement et al. (2003), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Levi (2008)) has been the 
only country that has gone to such a regulatory change. Gounopoulos and Skinner (2010) 
report that comparison of these two regimes suggests that mandatory earnings forecasts can 
force firms to forecast that have neither the incentives nor the ability to do so. Instead, the 
results imply that regulations penalizing IPOs for providing highly inaccurate forecasts 
appear to be a more appropriate regulatory strategy. The accuracy of earnings improves after 
the introduction of voluntary disclosures where firms that provide forecasts are 
characterized as mature, with high demand multiple and low retained ownership.  
 
   4. Methodology, Data, Variables 
 
4.1 Βrief review of historical evidence 
 
Champers and Dimson (2009) have been the first to provide evidence on UK IPO 
underpricing for a period which covers almost a century. Τhere have also been few studies 
concentrating on shorter periods of  the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Burhop (2008) 
examines underpricing of IPOs at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1896.  He 
finds extraordinarily low first day returns.  
 Fohlin (2000) investigates whether IPO underpricing depends on the organization of 
the financial system, comparing IPOs listed in Berlin between 1882-1892 and New York of 
1998-2000. The results indicate the relevance of underwriter reputation to underpricing 
which varies dramatically over time and across countries. The study also shows that firm 
quality is positively related to underpricing. Schlag and Wodrich (2005) extend Fohlin‟s 
study investigating the pricing of German IPOs for the period 1882-1914. Their results 
confirm low underpricing as compared with today‟s markets. Furthermore, the study finds 
no evident impact of the changing institutional setting on underpricing, after the 
establishment of tighter stock market regulation.  
Finally Champers (2009) revisits the British literature by highlighting market 
development from 1945 to 1986. Results indicate that by the 1960s, underpricing of IPOs in 
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the UK was regarded as excessive. While some margin of underpricing was necessary to 
avoid under-subscription, and the adverse publicity associated with shares registering a loss 




We use three proxies for uncertainty on firm quality: size, age and the book value/price 
relative. Size, is measured by the natural logarithm of post-IPO capitalization of all 
outstanding shares at the offer price. The age of the firm, measures the period from the 
establishment of the firm until the year of going public. (The natural logarithm Ln (1+ AGE) 
is the actual variable used). The ratio of book value to offer price, BVP, is extracted from the 
post-IPO net asset value per share held by shareholders. 
 A fourth variable is the time elapsed the offer price announcement date and the 
listing date of an IPO, TLAG.  In the U.S. and increasingly in Europe, the offer price is set 
just days (or even hours) before trading on the stock market begins. This means that market 
movements between pricing and trading are negligible and usually ignored. In Greece 
however, there are substantial delays between pricing and trading, and it makes sense to 
control the estimate of underpricing for interim market movements. Literature documents 
that the longer the time period between pricing and trading, the greater will be the 
underpricing, as investors are expected to discount market changes that occur during the 
interval. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter (1992) have argued that 
investment banker prestige is closely associated with underpricing, underwriter 
compensation and subsequent performance of IPOs. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) suggest 
that by agreeing to be associated with an offering, prestigious intermediaries “certify” the 
quality of the issue. Loughran and Ritter (2004) indicate that banks have begun to 
underprice IPOs strategically, in an effort to enrich themselves or their investment clients. 
Ljungqvist (2007) clarifies that the information content of the firm‟s choice may reduce 
investors‟ incentives to produce their own information, which in turn will mitigate the 
winner‟s curse. We classify underwriter‟s influence, by employing one dummy variable 
(UND) which takes the value of one when an IPO is underwritten by one of the large four 
Greek banks
6
 and zero otherwise. This factor plays an important role in pricing and 
                                               




distributing an IPO, certifying the quality of the issue by underwriter‟s past performance in 
IPO underwriting.  
 Since its introduction by Britain‟s Thatcher Government in the early 1980s, 
privatizations have been an important component of the supply of shares in many markets. 
(Megginson and Netter (2001). Overall, the transfer of ownership from state owned 
enterprises (government) to private investors has been internationally recognized as an 
important factor of the IPO level of underpricing. The literature finds that underpricing in 
privatizations is generally greater than that of traditional initial public offerings (IPOs). For 
example, Perotti (1995) argues that privatization IPOs are underpriced to signal the 
government‟s determination to eliminate policy uncertainties regarding privatization plans. 
Biais and Perotti (2002) propose that underpricing is used in privatization IPOs to widely 
distribute shares among investors. We define PRIV as a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the IPO refers to privatisation of a state-owned entreprise, and 0 otherwise. 
There is a possible trade off between the proportion of post issue equity sold in the 
offering, and the extent to which shares are underpriced. In other words, underpricing may 
vary with the percent of given ownership (GO). Zingales (1995) assumes that an IPO is 
frequently only the first stage in a multi-period sell-out strategy which will culminate in the 
complete transfer of ownership and control from the original founders to new owners. Booth 
and Chua (1996) argue that owners value a more dispersed ownership structure because it 
likely results in a more liquid secondary market for their shares. Ljungqvist (2007) indicates 
that higher equity ownership gives the decision-maker a greater stake in the outcome of the 
pricing negotiations. Overall underpricing stock sold represents a direct wealth transfer from 
the decision-maker to IPO investors. 
 Two variables are also specified to capture the condition of the market, specifically 
the degree to which we have a „hot‟ market in any of the periods in our sample. Many 
researchers indicate for example, that the composition of firms undertaking IPO during the 
hot markets is different from that of cold markets (see for example Cook et al. (2001), 
Helwege and Liang (2004), Yung et al. (2008), Lowry et al. (2010)). Market conditions per 
calendar quarter have a double criterion: on one hand, the number of IPOs performed during 
the quarter and on the other hand, ex-post market returns of the quarter. The use of these 
two variables  is an extended version of the methodology used by Yung et al. (2008) and 
Boehme and Colak (2008). The two continuous variables capture respectively entrepreneur 
sentiment and investor sentiment. The first (NUIPO) is the ratio of the number of IPOs in 
each quarter to the quarterly average of IPOs in the whole sample. We have also estimated 
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the relative amount of capital raised per quarter (NCAP) as an alternative measure of the 
intensity of supply of IPOs. The second (RET) is the ratio of each quarter‟s market return to 
the overall average quarterly return over the period covered by our sample 
7
.  
Three dummy variables are also used. The first dummy variable (STAB) relates to a 
mandatory guarantee (by the underwriter) of the listing price over the first six months of 
trading for IPOs. This was mandated by regulation in 1981 and applied over that whole 
decade. Hence it takes the value of 1 for the periods 1981-89 and zero otherwise.  
 The second dummy variable (BB) relates to the introduction of „book building‟ as a 
device for underwriters to engage in price discovery. This was formally introduced in the 
Greek primary market in 2000. We therefore attach a value of 1 to variable BB for the entire 
period 2000-9, and a value of zero in other periods.  
The third dummy variable (PC) covers the years 1994-96 during which a price cap 
was enforced for the first day of trading of new listed shares. This was an administrative 
constraint that applied to all stocks traded on the exchange. At the end of 1996, it was 
relaxed for early trading of newly listed stocks. Its imposition clearly affected first day 
returns of IPOs and the inclusion of this dummy variable is intended to capture that effect. 
The variation daily limit at the time was 8 percent (Thomadakis et.al. (2011)). PC takes the 
value of 1 only for years 1994-96 and zero otherwise.  
 
The regression model of First-Day IPO Returns (FDR) is: 
 
FDR = a1 LN(SIZE) + a2 LN(AGE) + a3 BVP + a4 TLAG + a5 GO + a6 UND + a7 PRIV+  
         + a8 STAB + a9RET+ a10 NUIPO + a11 NCAP + ε      (Period 1950-1989) - (1) 
 
FDR = a1 LN(SIZE) + a2 LN(AGE) + a3 BVP + a4 TLAG + a5 GO + a6 UND + a7 PRIV+  
         + a8BB + a9PC+ a10RET+ a11 NUIPO + a12 NCAP + ε    (Period 1990-2010) - (2) 
 
In Table 3 we summarize variables and hypotheses. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
                                               
7
 The measurement of the RET which captures market sentiment is feasible on a quarterly basis only in the 




4.3 Sample and Data 
The sample includes listings of common stocks in the Greek stock market over the period 
1905-2010. 465 new listings occurred over the period.
8
. Basic sources for the construction 
of the database, are the Daily Official Lists, the Monthly and Annual Statistical Bulletins of 
the Athens Stock Exchange and the Annual Reports of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission (HCMC). Proprietary sources such as DataStream, Equityware and SDC 
Global New Issues database are also used to collect data concerning the stock prices of IPOs 
and values of independent variables after 1980. Data prior to 1980 have been hand collected 
from the archives of the Athens Stock Exchange. Fact books have been the source for the 
age of firms at the year of going public. Prospectuses are the main material to extract 
information on the principal underwriter and percentage of ownership sold in the market. 
Old newspapers („The Truth‟, „The Renaissance‟ etc), Financial Periodicals („Economic 
Chronicles‟, „Economic Hellas‟ and „Shareholder‟) and historical books9, were extensively 
used to acquire familiarity with the history of financial events.   
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of all our continuous variables for the period of 
the sample.  
 
Insert table 4 here 
 
We measure the level of underpricing as the initial returns of IPOs listed in the 
A.S.E. by the First Day Return (FDR)
10














                                               
8 In the present study we exclude 12 offers that were performed on the new, flexible market of A.S.E., founded 
in February 2008, named Alternative Market (The EN.A.). This is a “non-regulated” market which operates as 
a Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF), as described in Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFiD).  As 
a result it does not come under obligatory provisions that apply in regulated markets for admission and 
ongoing requirements. 
9 vi) Athens Stock Exchange, „1915 Almanac‟was extensively used. See also footnote 1.     
10 The raw initial return can be considered a measure of underpricing, assuming that the normal return under 
efficiency would be 0 and that the equity risk is equivalent to the market risk. Other methods relax these 
assumptions and adjust raw returns. 
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where: FDRi,t= First Day (Initial) Return of company „i‟ at period t, OPi,0=IPO offer price as 
per prospectus of company „i‟, CPi,1=Closing price of IPO of company „i‟ at the end of the 
first trading day.  
 
5. Regression Results 
 
Table 5 depicts the results obtained from the regressions of the underpricing model (1). The 
three columns  report regression results which cover a) the set of 74 IPOs launched on the 
A.S.E. during the 1950-1989 period, b) the sub-period 1990-2010 when 350  new issues 
were listed on the A.S.E. using two alternative specifications of the IPO supply variables 
(NUIPO or NCAP). 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
During the sub-period 1950-1989 the results, which appear in the first column of the 
Table indicate statistical significance for variables SIZE, TLAG, PRIV and STAB. The first  
three acquire negative coefficients, thus exerting downward influence upon underpricing. 
The effect of size is well expected as larger firms‟ quality is associated with lower 
uncertainty. The effect of the privatization variable is also probably due to the same 
underlying cause as the three privatisations that took place in that period were partial (with 
the state retaining a large share) and were all banking institutions for which there was higher 
transparency and regulation. The negative coefficient of the lag variable is somewhat 
puzzling, as it means that the longer the lapse of time between the listing price 
announcement and actual first-day trading is connected with reduced underpricing. Since the 
credit market was regulated at the time, this might simply mean that a delay in trading 
enabled a higher accumulation of available liquidity for a new issue, and underpricing was 
less necessary to lure investors, ceteris paribus.   
STAB, the dummy variable employed during the period 1981-1989, when a six-
month price guarantee was mandatory, captures a positive coefficient implying that the 
guarantee increased average underpricing. This means that underwriters preferred to 
underprice in order to reduce the probability of undergoing the expense of price 
stabilisation. This result confirms an earlier finding by Kazantzis and Levis (1995). 
 In the second column we report the results from the regressions estimated over the 
interval 1990-2010 which included 350 new issues. Several significant variables emerge.  
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First of all , SIZE exerts a negative influence on underpricing, as expected.  The time lapse 
between list price announcement and first listing is marginally significant and negative as in 
the previous regression. More importantly, the percent of ownership offered (GO) appears to 
be positively associated with underpricing. The implication is that as higher portions of 
ownership were transferred, more wealth was also transferred through a lower listing price 
from the original owners to investors. 
 The variables capturing market condition are statistically significant in this 
regression. The relative number of IPOs in each quarter is a positive influence on 
underpricing of IPOs during that quarter, implying that issuer sentiment and competition for 
placement of new shares are significant factors that affect offer pricing. In the third 
regression where NCAP replaces NUIPO, results are similar but weaker.  
 On the other hand, investor sentiment as captured by relative quarterly market 
returns also exert a strong positive influence on underpricing. Two competing explanations 
are possible: hot market conditions may actually heighten information asymmetries between 
issuers and investors; but also, hot market conditions engender speculative behavior among 
investors who are attracted to IPOs.  
 Finally, the two dummy variables are statistically significant in this regression:  
BB, the dummy associated with the introduction of book building, obtains a significant 
negative coefficient. This is an important finding since it shows that price discovery 
mechanisms used before the listing price is set have brought the offering price closer to its 
fair value. Hence as an institutional innovation in Greece this measure has ameliorated the 
efficiency of the primary market.  
PC, the price cap dummy variable exerts a significant negative influence, as 
expected. It therefore implies that the regulatory constraint was binding, ceteris paribus, and 







The examination of a very long track of IPOs in the Athens Stock Exchange over 105 years 
has shown that IPO activity has been maintained throughout the period, with the exception 
of times of war and crisis. This shows that the Exchange has always included a relatively 
active primary market and that firms used primary offers of shares and listing as an 
alternative to bank finance throughout a long period over which the character and the 
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regulation of the banking system changed significantly. An important finding is that IPO 
underpricing is associated with the post-war era, and hence constitutes a modern 
phenomenon. More specifically, within the post war period, it grew very substantially after 
the liberalisation of the financial system and widespread reforms in banks and the stock 
exchange.  
 The cross-sectional analysis of underpricing in two distinct post-war periods 
discovered several factors that affect its level. The size of the offer is a permanent factor that 
reduces underpricing and we can safely conclude, in line with a plethora of international 
evidence, that size acts as a signal of firm quality. The lapse of time between the prospectus 
announcement and the date of first trading also appears to exert a uniformly negative 
influence on under pricing. We surmise that this is related to liquidity considerations, and if 
so this is a matter for further research, as it poses the interesting question of IPO success in 
less liquid markets.  
The post-liberalisation period of 1990-2000 is by far the most important in our study 
as it contains about 70 percent of all IPOs conducted in the entire period of 105 years and 
also includes a visible intensification of underpricing. Within that period, one more firm-
specific factor that affects underpricing is discovered: the percentage of ownership 
transferred through the IPO from original owners to equity investors. This measure affects 
underpricing positively, in line again with international evidence.  
 Very significant factors that underpin underpricing in the liberalisation era however 
appear to be environmental and institutional.  Hot market periods significantly boost 
underpricing in Greek IPOs, as has also been observed in many other markets. On the other 
hand, regulatory constraints on daily price variation and the later introduction of book-
building appear to have improved the efficiency of the primary market, by significantly 
reducing underpricing.  
 Our overall evidence suggests that overpricing is a phenomenon that is probably 
associated with the advent of markets with open access and the expansion of potential 
buyers of issues from narrow networks of institutional and private investors to mass retail 
clientelles who seek short-term profits and are more prone to market sentiment and herd 
behaviors. The conversion of the exchange from a forum of „initiated‟ investors to a mass 
market is probably at the root of the rise of underpricing. At the same time, the 
intensification of the supply of IPOs may have also intensified competition among issuers 
and underwriters, and reinforced underpricing from the supply side. These conjectures 
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Table 1: Annual Volume, First Day Returns, Proceeds and Money on the Table, 1905 to 2010  
The study starts from 1905 as no IPO was registered during the first four years of the 20 th Century. IPOs that took place 
during the 19th century were excluded due to lack of data. First day returns are the change from the offer price to the closing 
price on the first day of trading and are equally weighted (EW). Raising Funds and money left in the table are in € millions 
expressed in 2010 prices. The amount of money left on the table is defined as the difference between the closing price on the 
first day and the offer price, multiplied by the number of shares sold. In other words, this is the first-day profit received by 
investors who were allocated shares at the offer price. It represents a wealth transfer from the shareholders of the issuing firm 











Mean First Day 
Closing Price  
Mean Rate of 
1st Day Returns 
Raising Funds 
(in €m) 
Money on the 
Table (in €m) 
1905 3 7.21 7.31 1.4% 8.66 0.00 
1909 1 2.23 2.23 0.0% 0.80 0.00 
1911 1 1.91 1.91 0.0% 0.28 0.00 
1912 2 3.28 3.28 0.0% 0.17 0.00 
1913 1 1.17 1.17 0.0% 0.12 0.00 
1917 1 1.35 1.35 0.0% 0.08 0.00 
1918 2 1.32 1.32 0.0% 0.29 0.00 
1919 1 3.40 3.40 0.0% 0.35 0.00 
1920 1 0.38 0.39 2.6% 0.01 0.00 
1922 1 0.63 0.63 0.0% 0.00 0.00 
1924 2 0.88 0.88 0.0% 0.08 0.00 
1925 3 1.57 1.52 -3.2% 0.31 0.00 
1926 2 5.06 5.09 0.6% 0.16 0.00 
1928 1 2.29 2.75 20.1% 0.95 0.19 
1929 1 6.75 6.75 0.0% 0.53 0.00 
1930 1 22.30 22.23 -0.3% 1.78 0.00 
1934 2 0.91 0.93 2.2% 0.09 0.00 
1935 2 2.20 2.34 6.4% 0.63 0.04 
1938 2 1.58 1.58 0.0% 0.42 0.00 
1939 2 1.91 1.92 0.5% 0.55 0.00 
1941 2 3.70 3.70 0.0% 0.26 0.00 
1945 1 0.88 0.88 0.0% 0.11 0.00 
1946 2 139.40 139.40 0.0% 19.84 0.00 
1947 3 96.06 96.06 0.0% 34.56 0.00 
1949 1 284.67 284.67 0.0% 7.11 0.00 
1950 1 146.73 146.73 0.0% 5.86 0.00 
1951 4 224.50 224.50 0.0% 59.73 0.00 
1952 1 64.56 64.56 0.0% 66.04 0.00 
1953 2 623.62 623.62 0.0% 17.43 0.00 
1956 1 0.84 0.54 -35.7% 2.73 0.00 
1963 2 1.73 1.73 0.0% 0.37 0.00 
1964 2 2.42 2.57 6.2% 0.46 0.02 
1965 1 2.35 2.05 -12.5% 0.14 0.00 
                                               
11  No IPO took place in years not included in the table  
12 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table became according to the first date 
of entrance of a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
13 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market 
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1967 1 2.88 2.88 0.0% 0.06 0.00 
1968 2 12.54 20.84 66.2% 0.79 0.20 
1969 1 1.85 1.91 3.2% 0.17 0.00 
1970 3 2.27 2.57 13.2% 0.90 0.13 
1971 1 1.03 1.03 0.0% 0.46 0.00 
1972 10 0.91 1.34 47.2% 2.14 0.91 
1973 17 2.96 3.05 3.0% 17.85 0.74 
1974 4 1.14 1.14 0.0% 5.10 0.24 
1975 3 0.89 0.89 0.0% 0.88 0.00 
1976 7 2.33 3.10 35.3% 7.06 0.29 
1977 2 1.35 1.60 22.9% 1.47 0.71 
1978 1 3.08 3.08 -10.47% 1.15 0.00 
1980 1 2.93 2.92 -0.5% 7.15 0.00 
1987 3 4.64 7.38 66.6% 11.69 8.03 
1988 4 7.08 7.42 6.3% 34.21 2.66 
1990 27 5.42 9.32 82.2% 54.01 46.24 
1991 14 6.06 6.92 14.2% 113.92 20.23 
1992 5 5.01 4.32 -11.3% 15.09 0.05 
1993 10 5.43 5.86 8.0% 53.31 4.27 
1994 46 5.48 5.73 5.4% 281.51 12.79 
1995 20 4.32 4.51 4.7% 72.60 2.73 
1996 20 4.36 4.62 5.6% 336.55 20.88 
1997 12 4.90 6.43 35.1% 50.19 11.09 
1998 23 5.85 8.90 59.5% 900.55 296.43 
1999 38 10.72 20.94 102.8% 1158.07 717.52 
2000 53 14.59 22.50 55.4% 2630.93 760.73 
2001 21 6.31 8.19 34.6% 1220.99 126.12 
2002 21 4.01 5.38 29.6% 101.49 26.87 
2003 15 4.37 4.91 6.1% 123.21 24.17 
2004 11 5.07 4.90 -11.8% 104.56 0.43 
2005 7 3.67 3.86 4.2% 84.17 7.49 
2006 2 14.05 15.49 10.4% 716.61 80.12 
2007 4 7.95 9.90 27.4% 791.35 728.07 



































Mean First Day 
Closing Price  






Money on the 
Table  
(in €m) 





244 6.25 7.54 11.58 41.64 7,715.27 1,972.14 
Intermediate 198 6.00 19.29 20.21 21.60 1,191.30 132.99 
War and 
Crises 
23 0.67 37.19 36.62 1.98 551.40 665.65 
Panel B: By Decades 
1905-09 4 0.8 5.96 6.04 1.05 9.46 0.70 
1910-19 8 0.8 2.12 2.12 0.01 1.29 0.00 
1920-29 11 1.1 2.42 2.45 0.01 2.04 0.19 
1930-39 9 0.9 3.94 3.97 0.02 3.47 0.04 
1940-49 9 0.9 89.00 86.00 0.00 61.88 0.00 
1950-59 9 0.9 261.93 261.89 -3.96 151.79 0.02 
1960-69 9 0.9 4.49 6.34 15.05 1.99 0.22 
1970-79 48 4.8 2.01 2.27 17.82 37.01 3.02 
1980-89 8 0.8 5.64 6.84 28.06 53.05 10.69 
1990-99 215 21.5 6.21 9.08 39.96 3035.83 1132.23 
2000-09 135 13.5 8.89 12.64 33.34 5783.31 1754.4 
Panel C: IPOs and Historic Phases 
1905-1949 41 0.95 22.84 22.32 1.25 78.32 0.25 
1950-1988 74 1.94 41.59 42.11 16.43 243.97 16.65 















                                               
14
 No IPO was taken place in years that not included in the table  
15 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table became according to the first date 
of entrance of a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
16 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market Exceptional Growth Periods:  
17Classification of periods - Growth: 1905-1911, 1923-1928, 1957-1973 & 1998-2006. Intermediate Periods: 
1918-1920, 1934-1939, 1950-1956, 1974-1977 & 1985-1997. War & Crises Periods: 1912-1917, 1921-1922, 
1929-1933,1940-1949,1978-1984 & 2007-2010. 
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Table 3: Testable Hypothesis to Explain Underpricing 
The variables which follow are used in this study as explanations for IPO underpricing. FDR, the dependent variable is the 
first-day IPO return, measured from the offer price to the first aftermarket closing price. Independent variables includes: 
AGE, Ln (1+AGE) the log of the total of one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date, SIZE – Ln (SIZE)  
market capitalization, i.e. log of the total number of outstanding shares after the IPO multiplied by price per share,  Ln 
(BVP) - Ratio of book value to offer price (expressed by Natural Logarithm), TLAG - Time lag between IPO 
announcement (the date of prospectus) and first day of trading, PRIV- privatised firms gets the value „1‟ otherwise „0‟. 
Since the early 1990s, the privatization of state-owned enterprises has been very popular in Greece and has dramatically 
promoted the development of the capital market. Though there have been sporadically more privatizations in previous 
decades. GO - proportion of given ownership during the going public process, UR - Underwriters reputation which gets the 
value „1‟ for banking underwriters and „0‟ for others. STAB – Price stabilization was introduced in ASE in 1987 and was 
suspended in 1990. IPOs listed under price stabilization gets the value of „1‟ otherwise „0‟.  The purpose of price support 
mechanism was to boost investors‟ confidence and encourage participation in the new issue markets, PC - Price Cap ±8%, 
IPOs listed in ASE with a price cap limitation of ±8% during Nov. 1993 – Nov. 1996 period. It gets the value „1‟ for IPOs 
listed during price cap period otherwise „0‟, BB – IPOs listed with Bookbuilding mechanism are assigned with „1‟, 
otherwise IPOs listed with traditional fixed offer method get the value of „0‟,   RET - Quarterly market rate of return 
divided by overall quarterly average, NUIPO - Quarterly activity of IPOs divided by average number of IPOs in each 
quarter, NCAP - Quarterly capital raised by IPOs divided by the average Capital Raised in each quarter. 




1Uncertainty    
a. Firm Risk Firm Age in years AGE - 
 Post-IPO market capitalization of all outstanding 
voting shares at the offer price = Size of IPO 









b. Time Risk Period between offer price announcement and day 
of listing 
TLAG + 
2 Privatization Type of ownership (public or private PRIV + 
3 Certification  Reputable underwriting  
(dummy variable) 
UND - 





Stabilization mechanism supported by 
underwriters  
STAB - 
 IPOs listed in ASE with a price cap limitation of 
±8% during Nov. 1993 – Nov. 1996 period 
PC - 
 IPOs going public with Bookbuilding mechanism BB - 
6. Market metrics Quarterly market rate of return divided by overall 
quarterly average 
RET - 
 Quarterly activity of IPOs divided by average 
number of IPOs in each quarter 
NUIPO - 
 Quarterly capital raised by IPOs divided by the 






Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 1950 to 2010 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Period 1950 -1988) 
 RET ISIZE 
 
LNISIZE AGE LN(1+AGE) BVP TLAG GO UND PRIV STAB NUIPO NCAP   
                
Mean 16.21 3.25m 12.19 27.43 2.99 0.56 32.54 19.68 0.36 0.05 0.09 4.56 0.63   
Median 0.00 0.6m 11.39 20.00 3.04 0.67 35.00 12.89 0 0 0 2.42 0.17   
Maximum 7.15 66m 18.01 133 4.90 1.35 55.00 100 1 1 1 10.89 13.2   
Minimum -35.08 0.58m 8.91 1 0.69 -0.54 9.00 10 0 0 0 1.21 0.01   
St Deviation 32.15 9.26 2.10 26.64 0.87 0.44 10.40 22.98 0.48 0.22 0.29 3.82 1.84   
Skeweness 1.70 5.53 0.72 2.07 -0.13 -0.92 -0.27 2.87 0.59 4.05 2.85 0.86 5.66   
Kurtosis 2.10 33.39 -0.15 4.63 0.06 0.25 -0.22 7.85 -1.69 14.85 6.30 -0.92 34.58   
No Obs 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74   
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics (Period 1990 -2010) 
 RET ISIZE 
 
LNISIZE AGE LN(1+AGE) BVP TLAG GO UND PRIV PC BB RET NUIPO NCAP 
Mean 37.44 38.3m 15.82 18.13 2.65 1.35 29.81 19.74 0.34 0.05 0.26 0.38 0.42 1.63 1.11 
Median 8.00 7.49m 15.80 14.50 2.71 1.19 28.00 20.00 0 0 0 0 0.13 1.40 0.53 
Maximum 472.42 3110m 21.86 120 4.80 5.09 81 68.44 1 1 1 1 25.5 3.58 12.2 
Minimum -76.67 0.58m 0.00 0 0.00 -2.16 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 -4.94 0.20 0.05 
St Deviatio 65.06 181.43 2.04 15.98 0.80 0.99 11.47 8.65 0.47 0.23 0.44 0.48 4.24 0.93 1.82 
Skeweness 2.60 14.32 -3.56 2.54 -0.39 0.45 0.80 1.91 0.67 3.84 1.07 0.46 3.09 0.70 4.30 
Kurtosis 10.27 237.42 29.10 9.81 0.41 0.98 2.07 8.44 -1.55 12.85 -0.85 -1.79 15.5 -0.6 22.2 
No Obs 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix (Period 1990-2010) 
LN(SIZE) 1.000            
LN(1+AGE) 0.170** 1.000           
LNBVP 0.196** 0.030 1.000          
TLAG -0.182** 0.014 -0.076* 1.000         
GO 0.176** 0.030 -0.150** 0.025 1.000        
UND -0.051 0.034 0.015 0.112* 0.069 1.000       
PRIV 0.217** 0.091* 0.133** -0.114** 0.046 -0.047 1.000      
PC -0.253** 0.022 0.164** 0.204** 0.181** 0.235** -0.091 1.000     
BB -0.162** -0.081 0.159** -0.315** -0.018 -0.571** 0.108* -0.47** 1.000    
RET -0.052 -0.009 -0.009 0.046 0.018 -0.213** -0.032 0.068 -0.20** 1.000   
NUIPO 0.097** 0.058 -0.307** 0.011 -0.021 0.112* -0.026 -0.106* 0.041 -0.128* 1.000  
NCAP -0.411** 0.100** 0.177** -0.197 -0.007 -0.050 -0.172** -0.39** 0.222** 0.006 0.129** 1.000 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions of First Day Returns 1950 to 2010 
The dependent variable, FDR, is the first-day IPO return. Independent variables includes: SIZE – Ln (SIZE)  market 
capitalization, i.e. log of the total number of outstanding shares after the IPO multiplied by price per share, AGE - Ln (1+AGE) the 
log of the total of one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date, Ln (BVP) - Ratio of book value to offer 
price (expressed by Natural Logarithm), TLAG - Time lag between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus) and 
first day of trading, GO - proportion of given ownership during the going public process, UR - Underwriters reputation 
which gets the value „1‟ for banking underwriters and „0‟ for others, PRIV - privatised firms gets the value „1‟ 
otherwise „0‟, HC – is the market condition. It takes the value „1‟ for IPOs listed in the hot period, and in Cold periods 
it takes the value of „0‟. PC – During 1993-1996 period a price cap of ±8 was introduced for new listed firms. When an 
IPO reached the limit, it would freeze at that limit and no more trading could take place on the same day, except at (or 
of course within) the limit range. This is dummy variable getting the value of 1 for IPOs listed during the 1993-1996 
period, otherwise 0. BB – Bookbuilding method of going public was introduced in 2000. IPOs listed with fixed offer 
price mechanism are symbolized with „0‟ and those going public with bookbuilding get the value of „1‟ . RET - 
Quarterly market rate of return divided by overall quarterly average, NUIPO - Quarterly activity of IPOs divided by 
average number of IPOs in each quarter, NCAP - Quarterly capital raised by IPOs divided by the average Capital 
Raised in each quarter  White‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method has been applied. p-values are in 
parentheses* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
VARIABLES 1950-1989 1990-2010 1990-2010 
Constant 139.7*** 164.6*** 194.3*** 
 3.77 (0.000354) 4.64 (4.93e-06) 4.68 (4.22e-06) 
LnSIZE -6.424*** -9.171*** -10.64*** 
 -3.21 (0.00207) -3.60 (0.000364) -3.55 (0.000447) 
Ln (1+AGE) -2.364 4.566 5.243 
 -0.39 (0.698) 1.02 (0.309) 1.10 (0.271) 
LnBVP -10.58 3.217 14.04*** 
 -0.79 (0.433) 1.01 (0.315) 3.69 (0.000263) 
TLAG -0.838 -0.476** -0.218 
 -1.72 (0.099) -2.24 (0.0258) -0.95 (0.342) 
GO 0.0981 0.501* 0.369 
 0.73 (0.470) 1.71 (0.0879) 1.22 (0.222) 
UND -8.244 4.785 10.62 
 -0.73 (0.471) 0.72 (0.473) 1.53 (0.128) 
PRIV -25.89* -4.576 3.337 
 -1.94 (0.0567) -0.33 (0.739) 0.25 (0.805) 
STAB 30.89*   
 1.85  (0.094)   
PC  -80.23*** -61.79*** 
  -9.23 (0.000) -8.27 (0.000) 
BB  -38.93*** -30.65*** 
  -4.69 (3.93e-06) -3.41(0.000729) 
RET  1.545* 0.724 
  1.75 (0.0815) 0.73 (0.465) 
NUIPO -1.141 25.40***  
 -1.10 (0.276) 5.20 (3.41e-07)  
NCAP   3.192** 
   2.05 (0.0407) 
Observations 74 350 350 
Adjusted R-squared 0.192 0.272 0.207 
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Appendix A: Annual Volume, First Day Returns, Proceeds and Money on the Table, 1905 to 
2010 (with inflation adjustment) 
The study starts from 1905 as it has not been registered any IPO during the previous four years of the 20 th Century. 
IPOs that took place during the 19th century were excluded due to lack of data. Severe effort has gone through in order 
to collect all data involving IPOs of the 20th century. First day returns are the change from the offer price to the final 
price on the first day of trading and are equally weighted (EW). Raising Funds and money left in the table are in € 
millions at the end of 2009 prices. The amount of money left on the table is defined as the difference between the 
closing price on the first day and the offer price, multiplied by the number of shares sold. In other words, this is the 
first-day profit received by investors who were allocated shares at the offer price. It represents a wealth transfer from 
the shareholders of the issuing firm to these investors. Historically, IPOs that left a lot of money on the table were 
primarily very large offerings with moderate underpricing. Inflation has been adjusted based on Gross Domestic 











Mean First Day 
Closing Price  






Money on the 
Table (in €m) 
1905 3 748.26 758.64 1.4% 909.91 0.61 
1909 1 231.43 231.43 0.0% 84.47 0.00 
1911 1 198.22 198.22 0.0% 30.06 0.00 
1912 2 340.40 340.40 0.0% 18.63 0.00 
1913 1 121.42 121.42 0.0% 12.94 0.00 
1917 1 140.10 140.10 0.0% 8.50 0.00 
1918 2 136.99 136.99 0.0% 30.83 0.00 
1919 1 352.85 352.85 0.0% 36.83 0.00 
1920 1 39.43 40.47 2.6% 2.00 0.05 
1922 1 65.38 65.38 0.0% 0.99 0.00 
1924 2 91.32 91.32 0.0% 8.94 0.00 
1925 3 162.93 157.74 -3.2% 32.69 0.00 
1926 2 525.13 528.25 0.6% 17.57 0.30 
1928 1 237.66 285.40 20.1% 100.52 20.61 
1929 1 700.52 700.52 0.0% 56.73 0.00 
1930 1 2314.34 2307.07 -0.3% 187.46 0.00 
1934 2 94.44 96.51 2.2% 9.55 0.46 
1935 2 228.32 242.85 6.4% 66.29 4.92 
1938 2 163.97 163.97 0.0% 44.29 0.00 
1939 2 191.38 192.39 0.5% 53.20 0.14 
1941 2 344.60 344.60 0.0% 24.90 0.00 
1945 1 74.77 74.77 0.0% 0.20 0.00 
1946 2 233.97 233.97 0.0% 33.72 0.00 
1947 3 158.31 158.31 0.0% 57.66 0.00 
1949 1 461.02 461.02 0.0% 11.66 0.00 
1950 1 234.22 234.22 0.0% 9.48 0.00 
1951 4 345.11 345.11 0.0% 92.96 0.00 
                                               
18  No IPO took place in years not included in the table  
19 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table became according to the first 
date of entrance of a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
20 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market 
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1952 1 92.50 92.50 0.0% 95.80 0.00 
1953 2 841.11 841.11 0.0% 23.80 0.00 
1956 1 69.34 44.57 -35.7% 228.65 0.00 
1963 2 78.67 78.67 0.0% 17.42 0.00 
1964 2 98.21 104.30 6.2% 19.29 0.96 
1965 1 84.30 73.54 -12.5% 5.12 0.64 
1967 1 87.54 87.54 0.0% 1.99 0.00 
1968 2 352.41 585.67 66.2% 22.54 5.84 
1969 1 45.90 47.39 3.2% 4.50 0.14 
1970 3 50.31 56.96 13.2% 20.26 2.98 
1971 1 13.62 13.62 0.0% 6.19 0.00 
1972 10 15.86 23.35 47.2% 28.67 11.91 
1973 17 39.16 40.35 3.0% 239.20 9.93 
1974 4 13.34 13.34 0.0% 60.48 2.86 
1975 3 9.34 9.34 0.0% 9.43 0.00 
1976 7 22.69 30.19 35.3% 69.72 29.18 
1977 2 11.50 13.63 22.9% 12.68 6.17 
1978 1 21.72 21.72 -10.47% 8.42 0.00 
1980 1 16.45 16.40 -0.5% 40.67 0.00 
1987 3 23.40 37.21 66.6% 59.71 41.04 
1988 4 30.84 32.33 6.3% 150.94 11.77 
1990 27 18.62 32.02 82.2% 187.93 160.86 
1991 14 19.57 22.35 14.2% 372.58 66.18 
1992 5 14.79 12.76 -11.3% 45.15 0.15 
1993 10 17.29 18.65 8.0% 171.85 13.77 
1994 46 16.42 17.16 5.4% 853.95 38.82 
1995 20 11.11 11.59 4.7% 189.05 7.13 
1996 20 10.67 11.31 5.6% 834.15 51.76 
1997 12 12.37 16.23 35.1% 128.31 28.37 
1998 23 14.77 22.48 59.5% 2814.32 758.03 
1999 38 27.62 53.96 102.8% 3125.94 1872.11 
2000 53 36.13 55.72 55.4% 6667.96 1820.56 
2001 21 15.58 20.22 34.6% 3252.54 315.30 
2002 21 7.86 10.54 29.6% 201.40 55.04 
2003 15 6.49 7.29 6.1% 185.38 36.37 
2004 11 6.51 6.29 -11.8% 136.05 0.56 
2005 7 5.15 5.41 4.2% 119.60 10.65 
2006 2 16.44 18.12 10.4% 849.09 94.93 
2007 4 7.85 9.77 27.4% 1204.80 741.50 
2009 1 4.00 4.16 4.0% 10.00 0.43 
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1905-2010 465 54.83 62.71 30.47%
*




Appendix B: Classification by state of the economy, decade of going public and 











Mean First Day 
Closing Price  







the Table  
(in €m) 
Panel A: IPOs and Historic Phases 
Exceptional 
Growth 
244 43.86 56.31 41.64 
19.631.74 
4,928.27 
Intermediate 198 43.39 46.71 21.60 3,786.51 4,635.51 
War and 
Crises 
23 255.56 255.42 1.98 
998.73 
655.85 
Panel B: Complete dataset by decade 
1905-09 4 619.06 626.84 1.05 994.38 0.61 
1910-19 8 220.92 220.92 0.01 137.79 0.00 
1920-29 11 251.34 254.92 0.01 219.44 20.96 
1930-39 9 407.84 410.94 0.02 360.79 5.52 
1940-49 9 216.79 216.79 0.00 128.14 0.00 
1950-59 9 384.30 381.55 -3.96 450.69 0.00 
1960-69 9 141.81 193.97 15.05 70.86 7.58 
1970-79 48 26.54 30.12 17.82 455.05 63.03 
1980-89 8 26.25 32.17 28.06 251.32 52.81 
1990-99 215 17.45 25.29 39.96 8,723.23 2,997.18 
2000-09 135 19.85 28.85 33.34 12,636.8 3,075.77 
Panel C: Major Subperiods 
1905-1950 41 289.89 291.18 1.25 1,845.91 27.13 
1951-1988 74 94.46 103.14 16.43 1,227.86 122.18 
1990-2009 350 18.40 26.94 37.99 21,343.21 5,898.36 
                                               
21  No IPO was taken place in years that not included in the table  
22 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table is shown according to the first 
date of entrance of a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
23 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market 
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